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Personalized Pricing and Quality Design
Abstract
We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized
pricing and quality allocation (PPQ), whereby rms charge di¤erent prices and o¤er di¤erent
qualities to di¤erent consumers, based on their willingness to pay. We embed PPQ in a model of
spatial di¤erentiation, and show how information about consumer preferences a¤ects multi-product
rmschoices over pricing schedules and product line o¤erings. We show that rmsoptimal pricing
strategies with PPQ will be non-monotonic in consumer valuations. Our model sheds light on the
di¤erent product quality schedules o¤ered by rms, given that one or both rms implement PPQ.
Contrary to prior literature on one-to-one marketing, we show that even symmetric rms can
avoid the well-known Prisoners Dilemma problem due to the quality enhancement e¤ect at the indi-
vidual consumer level. The rent extraction e¤ect due to quality enhancement dominates the adverse
e¤ect of price competition. Moreover, this result is stronger when rms have a larger proportion
of loyal consumers. When both rms have PPQ, consumer surplus is non-monotonic in valuations
such that some low valuation consumers get higher surplus than high valuation consumers.
For a wide range of xed costs, we also demonstrate some results on the protability of adopting
PPQ and show the emergence of asymmetric equilibria, where one rm adopts PPQ and the other
rm does not when the number of loyal customers is less than a critical value. We extend our
analysis to asymmetric rms and show that when one rm adopts PPQ, it always increases its
quality level while the other rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged compared to when neither
rm has PPQ. We demonstrate that a rm with an ex-ante, smaller loyal segment can be better
o¤ with PPQ.
Keywords: Competitive strategy, Personalized marketing, Non-linear pricing, Price discrimina-
tion, Quality design.
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1 Introduction
Personalized pricing has often been dened as gauging a shoppers desire, measuring his means,
and then charging accordingly. This requires knowledge of each consumers preferences and an
ability to charge di¤erent prices to di¤erent consumers. The price o¤ered to a consumer whose
valuation for a product or service is known may be higher or lower than the posted uniform price
charged by rms who lack the sophistication to target individual consumers. Various technologies
exist today that allow rms to identify and track individual customers. This leads to the creation
of consumer proles, matching of consumer identities with relevant demographic information, and
comparison with the preferences of similar customers through various collaborative and content
ltering techniques. Based on such information, rms deploy algorithms to determine prices that
approach rst degree price discrimination.
There are several examples of personalized pricing. These include major providers of long
distance telephone service (such as AT&T, MCI and Sprint), mail order companies like Lands End
and L.L. Bean, who have individual specic catalog prices, the online data provider Lexis-Nexis,
which sells to virtually every user at a di¤erent price (Shapiro and Varian 1999), and rms in
nancial services and banking such as Wells Fargo and MBNA, who engage in individualized pricing
through personalized discounts on card fees (Zhang 2003).
Quality has often been dened as a broad notion that encompasses any feature that may a¤ect a
consumers willingness to pay for a good. This could include features intrinsic to the product itself
(such as durability, functionality or conguration) or those related to the quality of the shopping
experience, or the service level provided by the rm (such as warranties, return policies, delivery
schedule and customer service). In the context of customer service, when a rm renders a person-
alized service to each customer based on his prole, that is an example of a personalized quality
design. It is quite common in the nancial services industry to provide a di¤erentiated service to
customers based on their net worth, which is a good proxy for willingness to pay. For example,
when a call comes into a call-center, the customers prole pops up on the service representatives
screen and the call is addressed accordingly. Retailers like Lands End and L.L. Bean are also well
known for using such relationship management technologies for delivering personalized customer
service. This is increasingly becoming common in the hotel industry wherein hotels personalize the
frills provided to customers based on their proles (Bailor 2005). The market for computer servers,
storage devices and workstations combines personalized pricing and targeted quality allocation.
Major players such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Sun Microsystems use personalized discounting
3
for di¤erent customers. PC vendors like Dell o¤er computers of varying congurations to cus-
tomers, which di¤er in their speed and performance due to the presence of di¤erent processors and
memory modules. Consumers can either select a brand with a particular conguration themselves,
or a rms sales representative can recommend a specic product based on their interactions with
consumers. Similarly, it is quite common for consumers to choose extended warranties or delivery
options from a menu of choices, either by themselves or based on a specic recommendations by
sales representatives. In the enterprise software applications market, there is also a trend towards
customizing the product to suit clientsneeds as well as o¤er a personalized level of service quality
through the use of one-to-one repair schedules and uptime guarantees.
Many rms believe that the concept of making the right o¤er (price and quality) to the right
customer would be the way of the future. Hence, they are investing in technologies and processes
which enable the use of consumer information to tailor prices and services. In this paper, we use the
term personalized pricing and quality, or PPQ, to refer to the case in which a rm can implement
a pricing policy and o¤er a quality schedule based on complete knowledge of the willingness to
pay of each consumer. Since, the amount of information required for implementing PPQ is high,
in practice rms may not know valuations precisely. Hence, our results should be interpreted as
the solution to an important limiting case which provides a useful benchmark the case of perfect
information. Hence, we ignore the possibility of mistargeting, which results, for example, when a
rm mistakenly perceives some price-sensitive customers as price-insensitive and charges them high
prices.2 We examine the following questions:
(i) How does the presence of technologies which facilitate PPQ, a¤ect equilibrium price and qual-
ity schedules? (ii) when do rms competing on the quality of value-added services benet from
personalized pricing and quality design, and how does this depend on rm size? (iii) what are the
incentives for competing rms to adopt such technologies, and (iv) how is consumer surplus and
overall social welfare a¤ected by the adoption of PPQ technologies?
1.1 Prior Literature
A number of recent papers (Sha¤er and Zhang 1995, Bester and Petrakis 1996, Chen 1997, Fu-
denberg and Tirole 2000), have shown that when rms o¤er one-to-one promotions or other forms
of customized pricing, it generally leads to a Prisoners Dilemma which leaves all rms worse-o¤
2Chen, Narasimhan & Zhang (2001), have shown that mistargeting can have an important e¤ect. It softens
price competition in the market, and qualitatively changes the incentives for competing rms engaged in individual
marketing. Liu and Serfes (2004) also consider imperfect information in a spatial price discrimination model and nd
that when the quality of information is low, rms unilaterally commit not to price discriminate.
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compared to the scenario when they do not o¤er customized pricing. These papers are based on
ex-ante symmetric rms. Corts (1998) and Sha¤er and Zhang (2000) nd that targeted promotions
need not necessarily lead to a Prisoners Dilemma. However, they allow for at most one promotional
price by symmetric rms, and their result accrues due to an alleviation of price competition. A
closely related paper is that by Sha¤er and Zhang (2002) who consider perfect price discrimination
by competing rms in a model that includes both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, with a
positive cost of targeting customers. They are the rst to show that a Prisoners Dilemma can be
avoided with one-to-one promotions but only with asymmetric rms (when rms are dissimilar in
market size, ex-ante).
We show that even symmetric rms are better o¤ when they engage in one-to-one pricing
and product allocations, and can thus avoid the Prisoners Dilemma. In our model, this result
arises because of the quality enhancement e¤ect from o¤ering a continuum of qualities in the
market. With PPQ, rms can provide higher qualities to each consumer without the fear of intra-
rm product cannibalization which occurs in situations with self-selection. This occurs because
PPQ enables a rm to allocate a pair of price and quality to each individual consumer. This kind
of targeting leads to a higher rent extraction ability for each rm. This e¤ect o¤sets the price
competition e¤ect and makes it protable for symmetric rms to engage in PPQ. Moreover, in
contrast to Sha¤er and Zhang (2002) we show that when rms are asymmetric in size, even the
smaller rm can gain when both rms adopt PPQ.
Recent work on customer recognition and behavior-based price discrimination includes Villas-
Boas (1999, 2004), Feinberg, Krishna and Zhang (2002) and Acquisti and Varian (2005). Much of
the recent work on perfect price discrimination has been done either in the context of horizontal
product di¤erentiation (Thisse and Vives 1988, Sha¤er and Zhang 1995, Chen and Iyer 2002,
Bhaskar and To 2004, Liu and Serfes 2004). In the context of channel management, Liu and Zhang
(2005) analyze the benet of personalized pricing for a retailer. Our paper is also related to the
work of Choudhary et al., (2005) who look at the impact of personalized pricing in a vertically
di¤erentiated duopoly setting with each rm o¤ering a single quality. Our model is di¤erent since
we incorporate a continuum of qualities and prices, and rms are able to customize both prices and
qualities. Moreover, we also explicitly analyze the incentives that rms have for adopting PPQ,
when adopting PPQ entails some xed costs.
Our work is also related to the emerging stream of research on product customization. Dellaert
and Syam (2002) bring into focus the issues surrounding mass-customization via an analysis of
consumer-producer interaction. In Dewan et al.(2003), both rms make symmetric investments in
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product customization technology which leaves them worse-o¤ in a simultaneous mode game. In a
duopoly model of horizontal di¤erentiation, Bernhardt et al. (2005) show that despite an increase
in e¢ ciency, rms do not make symmetric investments in product customization technology. Syam
et al., (2005) show that rms nd it protable to customize only one of a products two attributes
and each rm chooses the same attribute. Syam and Kumar (2005) examine rms incentives
to o¤er customized products when the prices of all customized o¤erings are the same and the
degree of customization is endogenously determined. An interesting result from their paper is that
customization helps rms increase the prices of the standard products as well and thus rms can
increase prots by o¤ering both standard and customized products. They also nd conditions under
which ex-ante symmetric rms will adopt asymmetric strategies.
A common theme in the customization literature is that rms can customize their product to
eliminate product di¤erentiation, which leads to erce price competition. Further these papers also
di¤er based on whether rms customize prices or not. Our work is di¤erent from all of these papers
because rms in our model do not make decisions between o¤ering standardized vs. customized
products. They always produce the same number of products, i.e. the length of the product line is
xed. What changes with PPQ technology is the level of quality o¤ered to each consumer, and the
corresponding price charged. Basically, rms can choose to decide whether they allow consumers
to self-select from the (price, quality) menu or whether they proactively target each consumer
with a (price, quality) schedule. This ensures that even though rms know individual customer
types, there still exists su¢ cient product di¤erentiation. More importantly, unlike prior work, our
paper combines both personalized pricing and one-to-one quality allocation in the same theoretical
framework.3
1.2 Overview of Results
We highlight a number of ndings. First, in a duopoly setting, we characterize rmsoptimal price
and quality schedules, as well as consumer surplus and social welfare, when, neither rm, one rm
or both rms have PPQ. Second, in contrast to prior work, we show that quality enhancement
through the allocation of a targeted quality schedule to each consumer leads to less aggravated
price competition by strengthening the opportunities for rent extraction. Thus, the adoption of
3A simple example of this set up is as follows: Consider a consumer who wants to buy a computer from her favorite
brand (Dell or Apple). She can select the desired conguration of her computer (memory modules, processor speed,
graphics cards, etc) and pay the corresponding price from a catalog or from the Internet. Alternatively, one can have
a scenario where the consumer is not exactly aware of the precise conguration that she wants for her computer.
She walks into a physical store, and talks to a sales representative. The sales representative based on the customer
interaction process and other information sources (such as purchase history of the customer) recommends a specic
conguration. This would be an example of targeted quality allocation.
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PPQ technologies by competing rms can make even symmetric (or identical) rms better-o¤.
Even after explicitly accounting for the costs of PPQ, we nd regions where symmetric rms are
better-o¤ after adopting PPQ. This has important managerial implications for rms which practice
one-to-one marketing and are considering making investments in CRM technologies such as those
sold by Siebel, Terradata etc.
Third, we show that the adoption of PPQ by both rms has a di¤erential impact on average
consumer surplus as well as on the surplus accruing to a consumer at a given location. While
the adoption of PPQ results in a lower average consumer surplus, interestingly, we nd that some
consumers are actually better o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ. In particular, consumers located
closer to the middle of the marketwho are the least loyal to either rm or are the least likely to
buy from either rm, are the ones who are the most better-o¤ (in terms of their surplus) when
both rms adopt PPQ technologies. Intutively, in the absence of PPQ, its important for rms
to leave some information rents for their most loyal (higher valuation) consumers so that it can
prevent cannibalization wherein the higher type consumers buy lower quality products. This leads
to positive surplus for the higher valuation consumers. However, with PPQ there is no potential for
such cannibalization and as a result, rms do not need to leave any information rents for consumers.
Consequently, these loyal consumers are left with no surplus.
Fourth, we consider asymmetric rms (in market size) and show that, compared to the No-PPQ
scenario, when one rm adopts PPQ, it always increases its quality level while the other rm keeps
its quality schedule unchanged. Conversely, compared to the Both-PPQ scenario, when a rm
drops PPQ, it always decreases its quality schedule while the other rm keeps its quality schedule
unchanged.
For a wide range of cost parameters, we further demonstrate some results on the protability
of adopting PPQ. An interesting result is the emergence of an asymmetric equilibrium: situation
where one rm adopts PPQ and the other rm does not despite both rms being symmetric in the
size of their loyal segments. This occurs because in some cases, once a rm adopts PPQ, its rivals
benet from adopting it does not outweigh its costs. We also nd that starting from asymmetric
rms (in the size of their loyal customer segments) when rms progressively become symmetric, the
adoption of PPQ technologies increasingly becomes benecial to both rms. The rent extraction
e¤ect due to quality enhancement dominates the adverse e¤ect of price competition and this result
is stronger when rms have a larger proportion of loyal consumers.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail. Section 3 presents
a preliminary result that acts as a benchmark for comparative statics. We then proceed to Section
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4 and 5 to analyze the equilibrium when one or both rms have PPQ, respectively. Section 6
demonstrates the impact of PPQ on asymmetric rms. In Section 7, we provide some interest-
ing observations with the help of numerical analysis. Managerial implications of our ndings are
presented in Section 8. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider personalized pricing and quality design in a duopoly model.4 Two multi-product rms
compete in both the quality and price of the products they o¤er. Each rms product line consists
of a continuum of qualities, as in prior literature (Mussa and Rosen 1978). In this framework, a
rms focus is on the choice of price as a function of quality rather than the choice of quality levels
itself. This is because the implicit assumption in such models is that a rms product line length
is xed: all possible quality levels are produced by rms.
When neither rm has access to PPQ, prices are chosen simultaneously by both rms. When
only one rm has access to PPQ, the rm without PPQ chooses its price rst. After observing
this rm, the rm with access to PPQ sets a menu of prices. This setting is widely adopted in the
literature (see for example, Thisse and Vives 1988, Choudhary et al. 2005, Liu and Zhang 2006) for
two reasons. First, a simultaneous choice of pricing in this asymmetric game does not lead to a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. Second, in practice rms with PPQ can o¤er discounts to each consumer
given opponentsuniform prices for standard (non-customized) products. Personalized pricing is
executed for each consumer at the point of sale. Hence, a rm which engages in PPQ chooses its
price after a rival that has a uniform pricing policy (which must be posted and committed to before
sales occur). In other words, the exibility implied by personalized pricing incorporates an implicit
assumption on exibility in timing as well. When both rms have PPQ, the order of moves at stage
2 does not a¤ect the outcome; we again posit that prices are chosen simultaneously. Once prices
are chosen, at the last stage of the game (stage 3), consumers decide which, if any, product to buy.5
Two rms located at the two ends of a straight line from 0 to 1, o¤er a continuum of products
di¤erentiated in quality. The rm located at the left is denoted as rm L while that located on the
4We present an analysis of the monopoly model with or without PPQ in the supplementary technical Appendix B.
Note that the No-PPQ results in a monopoly are very similar to those with competition. This highlights the "local
monopolist" nature of each rm.
5Note that with PPQ each consumer receives a single (price, quality) o¤ering from the rm in accordance with
their types. Hence, its not critical for consumers to observe the menu before purchase in scenarios with PPQ. In
contrast, when a rm does not have PPQ, a consumer can choose any pair from a menu of prices and qualities. In
this case consumers do need to observe the menu of prices and qualities. This is feasible and common in practice too.
For example, using sources on the internet, or catalogues consumers can observe the di¤erent prices rms charge for
di¤erent possible congurations of a computer by changing the kind of processors, memory modules, and so on.
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right is denoted as rm R. Consumer types are denoted by the parameter  where  2 [0; 1] with
a uniform distribution. A consumer has positive utility for one unit only. The type parameter 
indicates a consumers marginal valuation for quality. If either of the two products o¤ers a positive
net utility, the consumer buys the one that maximizes their surplus. Otherwise, they choose not
to buy any product. The utility to a consumer with type  buying from the rm located at 0, rm
L, is
uL(q; ) = q  (1  );
while his utility in buying from the rm located at 1, rm R, is
uR(q; ) = q  :
Thus, for a given consumer,  is analogous to a transportation costof buying from rm L and 1 
is analogous to a transportation costof buying from rm R (Spulber 1989, Stole 1995).6 Thus, the
intensity of a consumers preference for a rm is inversely proportional to the the distance between
a consumer and the rm; the consumer located at 0 values rm L the most while the consumer
located at 1 values R the most. Without PPQ, rms are unable to observe each consumers most
preferred product. However, they know the distribution of consumer preferences.
In the case of PPQ, we allow one or both rms to be equipped with a technology that perfectly
reveals the consumers type before a given price and a given quality is o¤ered to the consumer.
Both rms know which rm has PPQ before the game is played. In practice, implementing PPQ
may well require some xed costs. However, if such costs are independent of the quality of the
product being o¤ered by the rm, they do not a¤ect the qualitative nature of the results. For
simplicity, we treat these costs as zero.7 We consider pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game.
Consistent with the prior literature, we assume that rms have a marginal cost of production
which is invariant with the quantity, but depends on the quality of the product (Moorthy 1988).
That is, both rms have the same cost function, but depending on the quality schedules they choose,
their marginal costs may di¤er in equilibrium. Each rm has a constant marginal cost for producing
6This is a very common setup in the non-linear pricing literature and is quite intuitive. The term, q or (1 )q; can
be regarded as the quality weighted transportation costs that is common in models with a horizontally di¤erentiated
market. This setup matches the scenario where two rms sell branded products and have groups of loyal customers.
Typical examples are fashion industry (apparel, jewelry, computers, shoes, luxury cars...etc.). In these industries,
brand preferences and product quality are often fused together in consumers willingness-to-pay (WTP). Basically
a straightforward interpretation of our model is that there exist customers who have very high marginal WTP for
quality for the products of one rm but not for products of the other rm. Customers who like Microsofts products
may not like Apples products because their inherent preferences for these brand are very di¤erent. Moreover, this
setup also captures the fact that customers who do not have loyalty towards any particular brand, have a low marginal
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for both brands.
7 In Section 7, we provide guidelines as to when rms should or should not invest in PPQ if the xed costs of
investing in PPQ are non-zero.
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the good, denoted by c. Further c() is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex
in q. That is, c0(q) > 0 and c00(q) > 0. For analytical tractability in solving the general model and
to highlight the impact of the cost function on di¤erent decision variables, we use the following
function: c(q) = q=: This function satises all of the above properties for  > 1.
3 Neither rm has PPQ
Consider the benchmark case when neither rm has access to PPQ (we call this the No-PPQ case).
Basically each rm o¤ers a menu of prices, p(q), for all consumer types . The decision variable
p(q) of the rm can be equivalently written as q() and p() since each consumer will self-select the
contract designed for his type in equilibrium.8
As shown by Spulber (1989), in equilibrium, each rm occupies half of the market. Basically,
the equilibrium pricing menu is similar to that of Mussa and Rosen (1978) since both rms compete
by lowering the price by a constant while keeping the quality schedule at the same level. We use
superscripts to denote the variables of rm R or L. Let LN and 
R
N denote the prot of rm L and
rm R, respectively in the No-PPQ case.
The objective function of rm R is given by
max
pR(); qR()
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

pR()  (q
R) ()


d; (1)
subject to the following constraints:
 (IC): Each consumer of type  chooses the qR() and pR() that the seller designed for him.
 = arg maxt   qR(t)  pR(t); 8 2 [0; 1]:
 (IR1): Each consumer of type  receives a utility level that is higher than 0. sR ()  0:
 (IR2): The marginal consumer B gets the same surplus from each rm and hence, is indif-
ferent between buying from rm R and rm L. That is, sR(B) = sL(B):
Intuitively, the IC constraint ensures that a consumer prefers the contract that was designed
for him, and the IR constraint guarantees that each consumer accepts his designated contract.
Firms set a quality schedule q() and compete for the marginal consumer by o¤ering prices that
8Rather than considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle ensures that the rm can restrict
its attention to direct mechanisms that is, contracts in which one specic quality-price pair is designed for each
consumer, and in which it is rational and optimal for the consumer to choose the price and quality pair that was
designed for him or her. This type of transformation is standard in models of price screening (see, for instance,
Armstrong 1996).
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progressively get lower as one moves towards the middle of the market. The lowest price is o¤ered
to the customer at  = 0:5:
Given the above utility function, the net surplus of each consumer following a standard transfor-
mation from the non-linear pricing literature (Armstrong 1996) is given by s()  u(q () ; ) p ().
Following the approach in the nonlinear pricing literature (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Maskin and Ri-
ley 1984, Sundararajan 2004), we substitute the pricing schedule, pR(); by the consumer surplus
function, sR() given that pR() = uR(qR(); )  sR(). Thus, we consider qR() and sR() as the
decision variables. Recall that each rm o¤ers a continuous menu of prices and qualities. Since con-
sumers choose any contract (p () ; q ()) from the menu, the incentive compatibility (IC) condition
for consumers is given by
sR() = max
t
  qR(t)  pR(t): (2)
From the rst order condition of (2) and using the envelope theorem, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 ds
R()
d = q
R () and ds
L()
d =  qL () :
The proof of this Lemma and all other results is relegated to the Appendix. This Lemma implies
that
sR() = sR(B) +
Z 
B
qR(t)dt; (3)
sL() = sL(B) +
Z B

qL(t)dt: (4)
It follows that due to the presence of the incentive compatibility constraint, the slope of the surplus
function o¤ered by rm R, sR() is determined by its quality schedule, qR(): In this model, note
that competition between these two rms only a¤ects the surplus o¤ered to the consumer at the
boundary given by sR(B): Basically, this implies that these two rms compete by lowering the
pricing schedule by a constant, sR(B): Given the continuous product lines (where there is quality
level available for every possible consumer type ), there is a fear of cannibalization because some
high valuation consumers might end up buying the lower quality product. Consequently, rms need
to leave some information rents for the high valuation consumers (consumers located closer to 0
or 1) in order to prevent them from buying lower quality products. Basically without PPQ, rms
have to "reward" their loyal customers to prevent them from buying lower quality products. As a
result, the rms decision variables can be further simplied into q() and s(B); where s(B) is the
surplus of the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from either of the two rms.
11
Based on equation (1), the simplied objective function for rm R can be rewritten as
max
qR(); sR()
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

qR()  sR()  (q
R) ()


d; (5)
Similarly, the optimization problem for rm L can be derived as follows:
max
qL(); sL()
LN ; where 
L
N =
Z B
0

(1  )qL()  sL()  (q
L) ()


d: (6)
Both (5) and (6) are subject to the same constraints as before. The detailed derivations are
provided in the Appendix. This leads to our rst result.
Proposition 1 The optimal prices, quality schedules and surplus functions of the No-PPQ case
are as follows:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
qR() = (2   1)1=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
sL() =
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
sR() =
  1
2
(2   1)=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
pL() = (1  2)1=( 1)
 2 + + 1
2

;  2 [0; 1=2];
pR() = (2   1)1=( 1)

2 +   1
2

;  2 [1=2; 1]:
Since each rm covers half the market, the indi¤erent customer is located at  = 0:5: Note that
the total surplus generated by rm R is qR()   (qR)() : This implies that the socially optimal
quality level (rst-best solution) is given by qR () = ( 1): By comparing this quality level with
the optimal quality schedule actually o¤ered by the rm, we nd that the quality received by each
consumer is lower than the socially optimal level (except for the highest type whose  = 1). This
degradation of quality happens because of the potential for cannibalization. Basically, due to the
nature of the self-selection problem, higher the o¤ered quality by the rm to a consumer, more is
the information rent needed to be given to higher valuation consumers in order to prevent them
from deviating to buy its lower quality products. This causes the rm to distort the quality of the
product o¤ered to each consumer.
4 Only One Firm Has PPQ
Next, we analyze a situation in which only one rm has access to technologies which facilitate PPQ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that among these two rms, only rm R has PPQ. To solve
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this game, we analyze a setting in which each rm makes its pricing decision sequentially rather
than simultaneously. At stage 1, rm L (the rm without PPQ) announces its menu and allows
consumers to self-select a particular quality (and price) from its product line. At stage 2, rm R
(the rm with PPQ) targets every consumer with a specic quality (and price) in accordance with
their type. In the nal stage, consumers choose which rm to buy from and demand is realized.
The solution concept of this section is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Given any strategy of rm L, in equilibrium, rm R will o¤er the socially optimal level of
quality to maximize its prot because it can perfectly target consumers to avoid cannibalization.
Generally, whenever one rm acquires PPQ, it does not need to consider the cannibalization problem
since consumers can now be allocated the price and quality pair exactly in accordance with their
valuation. Let LR and 
R
R denote the prot of rm L and rm R, respectively in the this case.
Formally, the maximization problem of rm R can be written as
max
qR(); sR()
RR(); where 
R
R() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

;8 2 [0; 1]: (7)
Firm R sets the price, or equivalently, sets the surplus function sR(), such that each consumers
surplus exactly matches his/her surplus from the outside opportunity, which is either equal to zero or
equal to the surplus from buying from rm L. Given Rs strategy described above, Ls optimization
problem is the same as that in the No-PPQ case given by equation (6) except that (IR2), is replaced
by the socially optimal surplus curve of rm R given as follows:
sL(B) = max
qR()

qR()  (q
R) ()


j=B: (8)
If rm L were to o¤er less than the socially optimal surplus of rm R, then rm R could potentially
poach Ls consumers by o¤ering lower prices and by adjusting quality. The potential for poaching
exists since rm R can perfectly identify each consumer, and in particular, it can lower its price to
marginal cost for the consumer at the boundary. Thus, rm L can retain the marginal consumer at
B (that is, maintain its market share) only if its surplus sL(B) equals the socially optimal surplus
o¤ered by rm R. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the case when only one rm has PPQ, the optimal prices, quality schedules and
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surplus functions are as follows:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; B];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [B; 1];
sL(B) = (1  1

)(1  2B)=( 1)  B=( 1);
sL() = sL(B)    1
2
(1  2B)=( 1) +   1
2
(1  2)=( 1);  2 [0; B];
sR() = max [0; (1  )qL(B)  pL(B)];  2 [B; 1]
pL() = (1  )(1  2)1=( 1)   sL();  2 [0; B];
pR() = =( 1)   sR();  2 [B; 1]:
The marginal consumers type is given by B =
h
(2 1 1 )
 1
 + 2
i 1
: For the quadratic cost
function case this turns out to be B = 0:27: Although a general expression of s(B) and prices are
analytically tractable, the math is not easily parsable and so we do not present it in the main body
of the paper. However, we do derive several interesting results in the latter sections.
5 Both Firms Have PPQ
In this case, both rms have complete knowledge of each consumers type and are able to implement
PPQ. We term this the Both-PPQ case and derive the Nash equilibrium of this game. Since both
rms have full information about consumer preferences for price and quality, they engage in a
Bertrand-type price competition. Consequently, in equilibrium both rms o¤er a socially optimal
level of quality. A rm located closer to a given consumer will set a price schedule such that it can
exactly match the consumer surplus o¤ered by its rival. The rmsprot functions are given by
max
qL(); sL()
LBoth(); where 
L
Both() = (1  )qL()  sL() 
(qL) ()

; (9)
max
qR(); sR()
RBoth(); where 
R
Both() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

: (10)
where sL() and sR() are equal to the socially optimal surplus o¤ered by the rival rm. Formally,
sR() = max
qR()
"
(1  )qR() 
 
qR

()

#
= (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]; (11)
sL() = max
qL()
"
q  
 
qL

()

#
= (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2]: (12)
Note that rm R o¤ers a surplus which is equal to the socially optimal surplus of rm L. If Rs
surplus is less than the socially optimal surplus o¤ered by L, L would be able to poach on Rs
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consumers by increasing quality or decreasing price. If Rs surplus is more than that of L, it is not
maximizing its prot. Hence, it is optimal for rm R to increase its price to the prot maximizing
level.
Given the kind of price competition that will ensue between the two rms, we can determine
the surplus functions sL(); sR(); and hence point out the optimal price schedules. All consumers
whose  2 [1=2; 1]; buy from rm R in equilibrium. Similarly, all consumers whose  2 [0; 1=2];
buy from rm L in equilibrium: Basically, the equilibrium price from rm R (or from rm L) is set
so that consumers feel indi¤erent between buying from rm R and from rm L. The equilibrium
price o¤ered by each rm to its rivals consumers is set to marginal cost due to Bertrand price
competition. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 The optimal prices, quality schedules and surplus functions when both rms have
PPQ are as follows:
qL() = (1  )1=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
sL() = (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
sR() = (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1];
pL() = (1  )=( 1)   (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2];
pR() = =( 1)   (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]:
Note again that since both rms are symmetrically equipped with PPQ, they share one-half of
the whole market, similar to the NoPPQ case. In equilibrium, both rms o¤er a socially optimal
level of quality. Further, note that compared to the No-PPQ case the adoption of PPQ actually
decreases the quality di¤erence between the products of a rm. However, since qualities and prices
are now targeted (with PPQ), rms do not need to degrade qualities. Intuitively this occurs because
from a rms perspective, there is no fear of cannibalization in this case. Recall that since rms can
allocate qualities by targeting consumers directly with PPQ, there are no consumer self-selection
problems. As such there is no competition between the products of a given rm. Consequently,
rms do not have any incentive to degrade qualities o¤ered to their customers. Thus, they provide
their loyal customers products with better quality which results in higher prices as well. This leads
to higher prots than the No-PPQ case. On the other hand, despite o¤ering their competitors loyal
customers with higher qualities and lower prices (both rmsprices fall to marginal cost in their
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respective rivals turfs) they are unable to poach on their competitors territory.9 A comparison
of quality schedules o¤ered reveals that when a rm adopts PPQ, it increases the quality o¤ered
to each consumer. However, the rm without PPQ keeps its quality schedule unchanged. When
both rms adopt PPQ, their qualities are always higher than the NoPPQ qualities. This enables
them to o¤er a higher quality than in the No-PPQ case and charge higher prices. We discuss these
results in detail in the following sections.
5.1 Prices
We plot the price curves for quadratic and cubic cost functions in Figures 1 and 2 for each of the
three cases: (i) neither rm has PPQ, (ii) one rm (rm R, without loss of generality) has PPQ and
(iii) both rms have PPQ. Interestingly, note that when  = 2; the price functions are convex, while
when  = 3; the price functions are concave.10 The thick continuous U-shaped curves indicate the
price function when both rms have PPQ or when neither rm has PPQ. It is immediate to see that
rm prices are always higher in the BothPPQ case. The dotted discontinuous curve represents
the price function for the case when only one rm (rm R) has PPQ. Note that when only rm R
has PPQ, rm L o¤ers a higher price compared to the No-PPQ case but lower than the Both-PPQ
case. On the other hand, rm Rs price is higher than its price in the No-PPQ and the Both-PPQ
cases. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose the cost function is quadratic ( = 2). (i) Then, the adoption of PPQ by
both rms leads to higher prices for all consumers compared to the No-PPQ case. (ii) When only
one rm adopts PPQ, the rm without PPQ increases its price to all its consumers, compared to
the No-PPQ case. However, some potential consumers of the rm without PPQ, buy from the PPQ
rm at lower prices than in the No-PPQ case.
9The implicit notion here is that consumers buy from the rm o¤ering a higher quality product even if the surplus
o¤ered by both rms is exactly the same.
10The intuition behind this comes from the fact that a price charged to a consumer is determined by two e¤ects:
(i) that of the o¤ered quality (quality e¤ect) and, (ii) that of the information rent left for the consumers. These two
forces have countervailing e¤ects and thus the net shape of the pricing function depends on which of the two forces
dominate. Moreover, as  increases it becomes relatively more costly to o¤er higher quality products. Hence, quality
scheudles become more concave, and the pricing function also becomes more concave.
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Figure 1: Price with or without PPQ
(=2)
Figure 2: Price with or without PPQ
(=3)
Consider the case when  = 2: When R is the only rm that o¤ers PPQ, its market coverage
extends across the region where  2 [0:27; 1] while rm L covers the market where  2 [0; 0:27].
Notice that when rm R has PPQ, rm Ls price is always higher than its No-PPQ price. However,
rm Rs price is lower than rm Ls No-PPQ price in the region of  2 [0:27; 0:38]: Thus, consumers
in this region get a lower price. Essentially the intuition is as follows: Since rm R (the rm with
PPQ) knows the preferences of each consumer, it has the exibility to target some of its rivals
consumers. Firm L (the rm without PPQ) knows that rm R can o¤er a lower quality and lower
price at the margin, and thus lure away some of its own consumers, especially those with relatively
weaker preferences for its products (customers whose type  2 [0:27; 0:5]; given by the triangular
shaded regions in each gure). Although rm L can respond strategically by lowering its price to
prevent this poaching, it is less protable for rm L to do so, and hence it does not nd it optimal
to sell to all of its own potential consumers by lowering its price. On the contrary, by increasing its
price it is able to extract a higher surplus from its loyal customers (customers whose type  2 [0;
0:27] ) who have a stronger preference for its products. This results in higher overall prots than
those accruing from undercutting rm R and engaging in a head-head competition for some less
protable customers. Consequently, rm L o¤ers a higher price compared to the No-PPQ case.
Thus, the adoption of PPQ by one rm alleviates the price competition between rms and raises
the average prices. Indeed as we see from the gure above, when one rm (rm R) has PPQ, for
a wide space in the parameter region of  its price is higher than the price it o¤ers in the No-PPQ
and the Both-PPQ cases.
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5.2 Consumer Surplus
Proposition 4 (i) When both rms have PPQ, consumer surplus is non-monotonic in valuations
in that low valuation consumers get higher surplus compared to high valuation consumers. Speci-
cally, for all  2 [0; b]; and for all  2 [1  b; 1]; consumers get lower surplus when both rms have
PPQ in contrast to the No-PPQ scenario. Thus, when both rms have PPQ consumers located in
the middle of the market have the highest surplus in contrast to the No-PPQ scenario wherein these
consumers (in the middle) have the lowest surplus. (ii) Further, when one rm has PPQ, some of
its consumers are left with positive surplus.
In the No-PPQ scenario, the fact that consumers in the middle (or the ones which have the
lowest inclination to buy from either rm) have the lowest surplus comes from Lemma 1 based on
the incentive compatible constraints: This is similar to the non-linear pricing literature (Mussa &
Rosen 1978) where the lowest consumer type gets a zero surplus since each rm acts as a local
monopolist. Here as well, the local monopolist captures the entire surplus of the consumer at
the boundary ( = 0:5) as seen from gure 3. On the other hand, in the Both-PPQ scenario,
consumer surplus provided by one rm is determined by its rivals socially optimal welfare curve.
We can indeed verify that the surplus provided by each rm to a given consumer increases as the
consumers location gets closer to the rival rm as stated in the beginning of this section. As a
result, consumers located in the middle receive a higher consumer surplus, with the highest surplus
accruing to the consumer located at  = 0:5.
Interestingly, this result suggests that consumers who are the least loyal to either rm, are the
ones who are the most well-o¤when both rms adopt PPQ. Thus, we show in gure 3 that consumer
surplus is monotonic (non-monotonic) in valuations depending on whether rms dont have (have)
access to such PPQ technologies.11 Moreover, we note that as the cost of quality decreases (
increases), the optimal quality o¤ered to any consumer also increases. Hence, the surplus accruing
to any consumer also increases with : This is true when both rms have PPQ as well as when
neither rm has PPQ (except for the consumer located at  = 0:5).
11Prior literature in Hotelling models (for example, Ulph and Vulkan 2000) have shown that if transportation
costs do not increase fast with distance then all consumers get lower prices (and higher surplus) when rms practice
personalized pricing. This is in contrast to our results where we show that the most loyal consumers get zero surplus
while the least loyal consumers get positive surplus, and that the size of these loyal segments is driven by the
convexity of the cost function () parameter.
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Figure 3: Consumer surplus for di¤erent . Figure 4: Social welfare for di¤erent .
We nd that the total consumer surplus is highest when neither rm has access to PPQ. Thus, the
adoption of PPQ enables the rms to extract the maximum rent from consumers. Once again, the
additional rents from quality enhancement outweigh the price competition e¤ect from personalized
pricing leading to a lower consumer surplus.12
We nd that when one rm adopts PPQ, the consumer surplus from its rival is higher than
that in the Both-PPQ case, but lower than in the No-PPQ case. The intuition is driven by the
increase in average prices when one rm adopts PPQ. Further, note that when one rm (rm R, for
example) has PPQ, not all of its consumers are left with zero surplus. Of course, its own immediate
consumers (those whose type  2 [0:5; 1]) do not get any surplus at all. However, there are some
consumers in rm Ls territory, that R is able to capture by o¤ering them lower qualities at lower
prices. These consumers in the region whose type  2 (0:27; 0:5); are served by the PPQ rm, and
consequently a small proportion of them get a positive surplus. Specically, when  = 2 consumers
in the region where  2 (0:27; 0:345) get positive surplus whereas the remaining consumers are left
with no surplus.
5.3 Welfare
We plot the welfare curves in Figure 4 for each of the two cases as before: neither rm has PPQ,
and both rms have PPQ. We dene welfare of a consumer as the sum of the rms prot from
12Note that this is in contrast to prior work in personalized pricing (for example, Choudhary et al. 2005) who
show that total consumer surplus is highest when both rms engage in personalized pricing. In their model this
result occurs since rms could only personalize pricesthe products o¤ered to all consumers were the same. Hence,
the competitive e¤ect of aggravated price competition led to lower prices than in the scenario when rms did not
practice personalized pricing.
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that consumer and the surplus accruing to that consumer. Note from gure 4 that the total welfare
is highest when both rms adopt PPQ. Next, we show that the adoption of PPQ by one rm (for
example, rm R) has interesting welfare implications.
Corollary 2 Suppose the cost function is quadratic ( = 2). (i) When only one rm adopts PPQ,
social welfare may be lower than the NoPPQ and the Both-PPQ cases because of the misalloca-
tione¤ect. (ii) When both rms adopt PPQ, social welfare is highest.
The intuition for this result is similar to that for Corollary 1. The misallocation e¤ect arises
because in a socially optimal situation consumers whose  2 [0:27; 0:5] should have ideally bought
from rm L while those customers whose  2 [0:5; 1] should have bought from rm R. However,
when rm R has PPQ, it induces some of Ls consumers (those with  2 [0:27; 0:5]) to buy from it
by o¤ering them lowering qualities at lower prices. This lowering of o¤ered quality to each consumer
(from the rst-best solution wherein q () = ) results in a welfare loss compared to the socially
optimal scenario.
In general, in the No-PPQ scenario only the highest consumer type (that located at  = 1
or  = 0) gets the socially optimal quality. In the Both-PPQ case all consumers get the socially
optimal quality. Since both rms can identify each consumer, they do not need to degrade the
o¤ered qualities in order to prevent possible cannibalization, wherein the higher consumer types
choose lower qualities. That is, rms can maintain the incentive compatibility constraints without
having to lower the quality o¤ered to a given consumer.
When one rm has PPQ (say rm R for example), while all the immediate consumers of the PPQ
rm (those located between 0.5 and 1) get a socially optimal quality, only the highest type of the
rm without PPQ (rm L in this case) gets the socially optimal quality. The remaining consumers
of rm L (located between 0 and 0:27) as well those consumers of rm L (located between 0:27 and
0:5) who have been poached by rm R get less than socially optimal quality. In sum, although the
quality qR() increases up to the socially optimal level, not all consumers served by rm R receive
a higher quality product. Consequently, social welfare will be lower from transacting with some
consumer types within the region where  2 [0:27; 0:5]:
5.4 Firm Prots
Proposition 5 The adoption of PPQ does not lead to a Prisoners Dilemma. Both rms are
always better o¤ adopting PPQ compared to the No-PPQ case.
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Figure 5: Prots with or without PPQ for di¤erent 
From gure 5, we can observe that the prots in the Both-PPQ case are always higher than
that in the No-PPQ case for any value of . This result arises because of the quality enhancement
e¤ect. Each rm o¤ers a continuum of qualities, and then allocates a personalized quality at a
personalized price for each consumer.13This leads to a higher rent extraction ability from the loyal
consumers of each rm since it acts as a local monopolist. Even though the rm leaves some
surplus to consumers in the middle, the positive quality enhancement e¤ect o¤sets the negative
price competition e¤ect, and thereby makes it possible for symmetric rms to increase prots after
adopting PPQ. Basically when both rms have PPQ, they do not have any incentive to leave any
surplus for their loyal consumers that is higher than the surplus from the outside opportunity(in
the Both-PPQ case the outside opportunity is the surplus o¤ered by the rival rm). Since these
loyal consumers have minimal valuation for the rival rms products, neither rm has an incentive
to o¤er them any positive surplus. Therefore, they end up charging higher prices and reaping
greater prots.
6 Asymmetric rms (Market size)
In this section we consider the case in which rms are asymmetric in size such that one rm has
a larger loyal customer base than the other rm. We model this in the following way. Firms
are still located at 0 and 1 as before. However, in contrast with the prior section, customers are
uniformly distributed from 0 to r, 0:5  r  1:14 We are interested in analyzing the impact of a
13Recall that each rm o¤ers a continuous menu of price and quality pairs. We use the phrase "continuum of
qualities" to refer to the same phenomenon.
14Note that when r <0.5, only rm L can exist in the market when both rms have PPQ, and thus a comparison
becomes moot.
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loyal customer segment, which is determined by the value of r. As before, we have three cases: (i)
Neither rm has PPQ, (ii) Only one rm has PPQ, and (iii) Both rms have PPQ. The solution
concept is exactly the same as that in the benchmark case and is omitted here for brevity. We list
the optimal quality schedules as follows:
Proposition 6 The optimal quality schedules are given as follows:
(1) Neither rm has PPQ:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; B1];
qR() = (2   r)1=( 1);  2 [B1; r]:
(2) Only L has PPQ:
qL() = (1  )1=( 1);  2 [0; B2];
qR() = (2   r)1=( 1);  2 [B2; r]:
(3) Only R has PPQ:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1);  2 [0; B3];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [B3; r]:
(4) Both rms have PPQ:
qL() = (1  )1=( 1);  2 [0; B4];
qR() = 1=( 1);  2 [B4; r]:
This leads to the following results about how rms change their quality schedules with the
adoption of PPQ by either one or both rms. The values of the marginal customer (Bi) are derived
in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 Compared to the No-PPQ case, (i) when the larger rms gets PPQ, it always
increases its quality level while the smaller rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. (ii) when the
smaller rm gets PPQ, it always increases its quality while the larger rm keeps its quality schedule
unchanged.
The intuition for this result is similar to that in Corollary 2. Basically, any rm which gets PPQ
will not have an incentive to degrade qualilties because it no longer has to worry about consumer
self-selection and product cannibalization. Hence, it increases its quality schedule.
Proposition 8 Compared to the Both-PPQ case, (i) when the smaller rm gets PPQ, the larger
rm decreases its quality while the smaller rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. (ii) when the
larger rm gets PPQ, the smaller rm decreases its quality while the larger rm keeps its quality
schedule unchanged.
An interesting observation is that when one rm acquires PPQ, it changes its quality compared
to the No-PPQ case but keeps it unchanged compared to the Both-PPQ case. Intuitively this
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occurs because competition between rms only determines the surplus function, and consequently
the optimal price functions. Notice that when both rms have PPQ, we nd that optimal prices,
quality schedules and surplus functions are independent of the range of  between which consumers
are distributed (i.e. the quality and price schedules are independent of r). This is because rms
know the preferences of each consumer and are able to o¤er them the corresponding (price, quality)
schedule in accordance with their type. When one rm acquires PPQ, it increases its quality
schedule to all types in comparison to what it was o¤ering in the absence of PPQ. As a consequence,
the total welfare will be higher for customers buying from the rm with PPQ.
7 PPQ Technology Adoption Decision
Next, we investigate when and which rm will adopt PPQ, when adopting PPQ entails a cost.
Suppose in the very rst stage, each rm decides whether or not to adopt the PPQ technology at
a xed cost of F . In the second stage, similar to the previous analysis, rms play a simultaneous
pricing game when both rms have PPQ (or when both rms do not have PPQ). They play a
sequential pricing game when only one rm has PPQ. We are interested in determining the range
of xed costs over which the adoption of PPQ leads to a positive outcome for both rms or a
negative outcome such as a Prisoners Dilemma where both rms are worse-o¤ in comparison to
the scenario when neither of them have PPQ. In order to determine the impact of market size and
customer loyalty on each rms optimal strategies, we generalize the range over which customers
are uniformly distributed. In particular, we consider two stylized examples; one in which customer
type  is distributed between [1  r; r] (which we refer to as the symmetric case), and the other in
which customer type  is distributed from [0; r] (which we refer to as the asymmetric case). From
the symmetric case, we are able to analyze the situation when each rms loyal segment changes
equally. In the asymmetric case, the size of the loyal segment is di¤erent for each rm.15
7.1 Symmetric Case
From the expressions stated in the supplementary technical Appendix C, we can solve the total
prot of each case. When the customer type is uniformly distributed from [1   r; r], we have the
following payo¤ matrix.
Pay O¤ R, No-PPQ R, PPQ
L, No-PPQ (LN ; 
R
N ) (
L
R; 
R
R   F )
L, PPQ (LL   F; RL ) (LBoth   F; RBoth   F )
15We provide the detailed derivations of the expressions for rm prots in Appendix C.
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The rmspayo¤s with a change in the value of r are shown in gure 6a. A complete charac-
terization of all Nash Equilibria (NE) is depicted in gure 6b.
Figure 6a: Firm Payo¤s with PPQ Figure 6b: PPQ Adoption When Firms are Symmetric.
Given gures 6a and 6b, we rst have the following result.
Observation 1: (i) When the customer types are uniformly distributed in [1  r; r] and r > 0:775;
the prot of each rm is higher after both rms adopt PPQ. When r  0:775; the prot of each
rm is smaller after both rms adopt PPQ. (ii) Moreover, it is not a dominant strategy for a rm
to adopt PPQ even if its competitor were to have PPQ.
We can observe that when r is larger than 0:775; it is possible to have situations in which both
rms are better o¤ after the adoption of PPQ. From this result, we conclude that when both rms
have a larger loyal segment, it is less likely that the adoption of PPQ will lead to a Prisoners
Dilemma. On the other hand, if both rms have few loyal customers, the adoption of PPQ will
lead to a Prisoners Dilemma. This result is in contrast with that of Sha¤er and Zhang (2002)
who show that the rm with a smaller market size is always worse-o¤ after the adoption of PPQ.
This happens because in their model the price competition e¤ect is stronger than the market share
e¤ect. In contrast, in our model the rent extraction e¤ect due to quality enhancement dominates
the adverse e¤ect of price competition and this result is stronger when rms have a larger proportion
of loyal consumers (when r increases) because the marginal benet from the quality enhancement
e¤ect will be higher for such rms.
In gure 6b, the thick black line below the triangular region is the di¤erence between RR and
RN : When the xed cost of PPQ technology, F , is higher than this level neither rm will adopt
PPQ. The second line in the middle of this gure is the di¤erence in the prot of rm L when both
rms have PPQ and when only rm R has PPQ, i.e. the di¤erence between LBoth and 
L
R: When
F is higher than this level, if R adopts PPQ, L will not adopt it to facilitate a level-playing eld
and vice-versa. In other words, in that region even with symmetric rms we have two asymmetric
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Nash equilibria in which only one rm adopts PPQ. Thus, we nd that depending on the costs of
adopting PPQ, it is not a dominant strategy for a rm to adopt PPQ even if its competitor adopts
PPQ. The lowest line at the bottom is the di¤erence of LBoth and 
L
N : When F is below it, both
rms are better o¤ after adopting PPQ. We provide a numerical example below to characterize
the regions where rms adopt PPQ and the corresponding value of the cost of PPQ. Note that the
numbers in this example are exactly equal to the rmsprots under each scenario (No-PPQ, Only
one rm PPQ and Both-PPQ) when  = 2:
Example 1: When r = 1; the payo¤ matrix is given as follows:
Prots R, No-PPQ R, PPQ
L, NO-PPQ (0:083; 0:083) (0:0654; 0:162  F )
L, PPQ (0:162  F; 0:0654) (0:125  F; 0:125  F )
Hence, the potential cases are as follows:
1. F  0:07 9; neither rm adopts PPQ in equilibrium.
2. F 2 [0:06; 0:079]; there are two NEs: either rm R or rm L adopts PPQ in equilibrium.
3. F 2 [0:042; 0:06]; the equilibrium is (PPQ, PPQ). Prisoners Dilemma oocurs in equilibrium.
4. F  0:042; the equilibrium is (PPQ, PPQ). Both rms are better o¤ after adoption of PPQ.
7.2 Asymmetric Case
In general, when a rm has a larger loyal segment, its incremental benet from adopting PPQ
is higher compared to the rm with a smaller loyal segment. Formally, when r is close to 1, the
benet of simultaneous adoption of PPQ by both rms is higher for rm R (smaller rm).
Figure 7a: Prots of rm L (larger rm). Figure 7b: Prots of rm R (smaller rm).
Notice from gures 7a and 7b that with an increase in the size of the loyal segment (r), the
adoption of PPQ always leads to lower prots for the larger rm and higher prots for the smaller
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rm. From gure 7b, note that when the larger rm has PPQ, the adoption of PPQ may in some
cases be detrimental for the smaller rm compared with the No-PPQ case, especially when r  0:79.
By comparing the Both-PPQ and Only L-PPQ curves, we can conclude that adopting PPQ is not
a dominant strategy for the smaller rm especially when the larger rm has PPQ and the number
of loyal customers it has is less than a certain threshold. The Nash equilibria are summarized in
gure 8. We demonstrate the impact of the size of the loyal segment (r) on rmsPPQ adoption
decisions with the following examples, which leads to Observation 2.
Figure 8: PPQ Adoption When Firms are Asymmetric.
Example 2: When r = 0:95; the payo¤ matrix is given as follows:
Prots R, No-PPQ R, PPQ
L, No-PPQ (0:087; 0:075) (0:069; 0:145  F )
L, PPQ (0:169  F; 0:055) (0:132  F; 0:106  F )
Hence, the potential cases are as follows:
1. F  0:081; the equilibrium is (No-PPQ, No-PPQ).
2. F 2 [0:07; 0:081]; the equilibrium is (PPQ, No-PPQ).
3. F 2 [0:063; 0:07]; there are two equilibria: (PPQ, No-PPQ) or (No-PPQ, PPQ).
4. F 2 [0:051; 0:063]; the equilibrium is (PPQ, No-PPQ). PPQ is a dominant strategy for L.
5. F 2 [0:045; 0:051]; the equilibrium is (PPQ, PPQ). Prisoners Dilemma occurs in equilibrium.
6. F 2 [0:031; 0:045];the equilibrium is (PPQ, PPQ). Firm L is better o¤ and rm R is worse-o¤.
7. F < 0:31;the equilibrium is (PPQ, PPQ). Both rms are better o¤ after adoption of PPQ.
By comparing example 1 (point 4) in the symmetric case and example 2 (point 7) in the
asymmetric case, we can make the following conclusion.
Observation 2: As the extent of asymmetry in market size increases (as r decreases), the
range of values over which both rms are better o¤ by adopting PPQ decreases.
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8 Managerial Implications and Conclusion
Firmsare increasingly realizing that the ability to establish attractive value propositions and turn
them into personalized and compelling o¤ers across the right channel for the right customer at the
most opportune moment - drives customer relationships, and prots. This has led to a widespread
adoption of CRM and personalization technologies by rms in di¤erent industries such as long
distance telecommunications, industrial products, mobile telephone service, hotels, IT hardware,
nancial services, online retailing, credit cards, etc., in order to inuence their customer acquisition
and retention strategies. Moreover increasing availability of exible manufacturing technologies is
facilitating quality enhancement through customization.
Our novelty consists in combining both personalized pricing and targeted quality allocation in
the same theoretical framework. Our model highlights how rms should allocate product or service
qualities, and prices, and how in turn, such targeting decisions impact the surplus of consumers,
and overall social welfare. In contrast to prior work, we show that quality enhancement through
targeted quality allocation leads to less aggravated price competition by strengthening the oppor-
tunities for rent extraction for rms, when rms are able to personalize prices as well. Thus, the
adoption of PPQ technologies such as customer relationship management systems (CRM) and ex-
ible manufacturing systems (FMS) by competing rms can make even symmetric rms better-o¤.
That is, when rms can better target the allocation of qualities and prices, and o¤er a broader
product line, competition becomes less intense because a greater proportion of the potential con-
sumers now has a higher willingness to pay for the rmsproducts. We account for the cost of PPQ
technologies which can include, for instance, the cost of FMS in the case that the product quality is
enhanced. Another example of such a cost could be those incurred in providing personalized services
when it is the quality of service that is being personalized for each consumer. Even after explicitly
accounting for such costs, we nd regions where symmetric rms are better-o¤ after engaging in
PPQ. Prior work (Sha¤er and Zhang 2002) has identied situations where asymmetric rms can
avoid the Prisoners Dilemma through the market share e¤ect. We show that even symmetric rms
can avoid a Prisoners Dilemma because of the quality enhancement e¤ect.
An interesting result is the emergence of asymmetric equilibria: situations where one rm adopts
PPQ and its rival does not, despite both rms being ex-ante symmetric. This is driven by the
presence of xed costs of PPQ adoption. This has important implications since in many industries
we do see such disparities in technology investments by rms of similar size and market share.
Another result from our analysis is that starting from asymmetric rms (in the size of their loyal
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segments) when rms become progressively symmetric, then the adoption of PPQ technologies
is increasingly benecial to both rms. This implies that industries with a higher level of rm
concentration will have greater incentives to adopt such technologies and invest in loyalty building
measures.
An implication of our analysis is that the adoption of CRM technologies leads to an increase
in the quality level of the entire product line of a rm. This is relevant for a rms pricing and
product line decision since the adoption of PPQ negates the threat from intra-rm competition
that was prevalent in the absence of PPQ. Basically, rms which adopt PPQ only need to consider
inter-rm competition, and hence it is optimal for them to o¤er a signicant product quality/service
improvement.
Our paper also o¤ers insights on the di¤erent product quality schedules o¤ered by rms, given
that one or both rms can implement PPQ. Compared to the No-PPQ scenario, when one rm
adopts PPQ, it always increases its quality level while the other rm keeps its quality schedule
unchanged. Conversely, compared to the Both-PPQ scenario, when a rm drops PPQ, it always
decreases its quality schedule while the other rm keeps its quality schedule unchanged. Such
changes in o¤ered qualities are often seen in practice. In the IT hardware industry, these kinds
of changes in quality schedules are often done through stripping o¤ some value-added customer
service, such as next-day on-site repair versus same-day 8-hour repair, or a 99% uptime guarantee
versus a 99.99%. Another example is that of hardware vendors like HP and IBM who di¤erentiate
themselves by providing superior warrantees, new generation web-based applications, as well as
clustering and security management software embedded in the same hardware box. Similarly, in
many industrial products markets, to add value to customers beyond the core product, suppliers
o¤er additional services as educational programs, 24-hour repair, consulting services, quality control
assurance and testing, just-in-time (JIT) delivery, either separately or via some combination of the
above. Many professional services such as IT or management consultants o¤er a wide array of
di¤erentiated services to their clients and charge di¤erent prices.
The adoption of PPQ by both rms has a di¤erential impact on average consumer surplus as
well as on the surplus accruing to any one consumer beyond a certain location. While PPQ adoption
leads to lower average consumer surplus, interestingly, we nd that some consumers are actually
better o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ. That is, there is a transfer of surplus among consumers. In
particular, consumers located closer to the middle of the marketwho are the least loyal to either
rm or have the lowest willingness to pay for either rms products, are the ones who are the most
better-o¤ when both rms adopt PPQ technologies. This is in contrast to a scenario when neither
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rm has a PPQ technology, when the very same consumers who are least likely to buy either rms
products, are the most worse-o¤. Basically, rms engaging in PPQ are able to extract more surplus
from consumers who have the strongest preferences for their products. In the absence of the ability
to discriminate, rms were extracting less surplus from them.
From a public policy perspective, our analysis of social welfare highlights that social welfare is
highest when both rms adopt PPQ. Indeed even if one rm adopts PPQ, social welfare is higher
than the situation where neither rm has PPQ. However in such a case, the total welfare for some
consumers can be lower because of the misallocation of the products. In particular, because some
customers of the rm without PPQ end up buying from the rm with PPQ at lower prices and
lower qualities, we see a decrease in social welfare for those regions.
Our paper has several limitations, some of which can be fruitful areas of research. For example,
we have only considered symmetric cost functions for both rms. Some rms may have operational
e¢ ciencies which can give rise to less convex production costs when customizing quality. It would be
interesting to see how rmsstrategies change under such scenarios. Another interesting extension
would be to study competition in markets with discrete segments such as loyals and switchers,
when rms adopt non-linear pricing schedules. A third area of related research would be to allow
competing rms to invest in loyalty building measures, such as switching costs, before they invest
in PPQ. Finally, we do not consider consumers making strategic choices in revealing information
about their preferences. One could consider a scenario where higher valuation consumers might
want to mimic lower types and vice-versa, in anticipation that some consumers are left with positive
surplus while others are not when rms engage in PPQ. Incorporating such a situation is beyond
the scope of this paper but it might be an interesting extension to pursue in a related framework.
We hope our research paves the way for more future work in this domain.
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9 Appendix A
9.1 Neither Firm has PPQ
Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed in a series of steps by rst stating and proving several lemmas.
Lemma 1 ds
R()
d = q
R () and ds
L()
d =  qL () :
First, recall that each rm maintains a menu of prices and qualities. Since consumers choose
any contract from the menu, the incentive compatibility condition for consumers is given by
sR() = max
t
  qR(t)  pR(t): (13)
The rst order condition is
  @q
R(t)
@t
  @p
R(t)
@t
= 0: (14)
This equation holds at t =  because consumers self-select the price and quality pair designed for
them. By di¤erentiating equation (13), we have
dsR()
d
= qR() +   @q
R()
@
  @p
R()
@
;
) ds
R()
d
= qR(): (15)
In the second equation, the last two terms are zero because of the rst-order condition as shown
above in equation (14). Using the same procedure, it can be shown that
dsL()
d
=  qL():
This Lemma implies that
sR() = sR(B) +
Z 
B
qR(t)dt
sL() = sL(B) +
Z B

qL(t)dt:
Note that the IC constraint ensures that a consumer prefers the contract that was designed for him,
and the IR constraint guarantee that each consumer type accepts his designated contract. Hence, in
this case (IC) implies that the slope of sR() is equal to qR() as shown in Lemma 1: In this model,
competition between two rms a¤ects only the surplus to the consumer at the boundary (which for
example is equal to sR(B) for rm R), which is a constant. This implies that two rms compete
by lowering the pricing schedule by a constant, sR(B): Higher consumer types will receive higher
surplus; this is termed as information rent in the non-linear pricing literature: This implies that
whenever the rm increases the quality o¤ered to any consumer, it has to leave higher information
rents to higher consumer types in order to avoid cannibalization during self-selection.
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As a result, our decision variables can be further simplied as q() and s(B), where s(B) is the
surplus of the marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from two rms. Substituting
for sR(); the simplied objective function for rm R can be rewritten as
max
qR(); sR()
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

qR()  sR()  (q
R) ()


d;
s:t: sR ()  0; sL(B) = sR(B):
After substituting for the value of sR(); the optimization problem becomes equal to
max
qR(); sR(B)
RN ; where 
R
N =
Z 1
B

qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B) 
Z 
B
qR(t)dt

d: (16)
Changing the order of integration of the last term in the bracket16, we can simplify the objective
function as
RN =
Z 1
B

qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B)  qR()(1  )

d; (17)
=
Z 1
B

(2   1)qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B)

d: (18)
Similarly, the optimization problem for rm L is given as follows:
max
qL();sL()
LN ; where 
L
N =
Z B
0

(1  )qL()  sL()  (q
L) ()


d; (19)
s:t: sL ()  0; sL(B) = sR(B):
After substituting for the value of sl(); the optimization problem becomes equal to
max
qL(); sL(B)
LN ; where 
L
N =
Z B
0

(1  2)qL()  (q
L) ()

  sL(B)

d: (20)
The optimal quality schedule can be determined by maximizing the integrand point-wise (the
terms in the bracket). This leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium quality schedules are qR() = (2 1)1=( 1) and qL() = (1 2)1=( 1):
Di¤erentiating terms in the bracket of (17) with respect to qR(); we have
   (qR) 1 ()  (1  ) = 0: (21)
=) qR() = (2   1)1=( 1)
The solution of rm L can be derived in a similar manner. To nd the solution of sR(B); we
di¤erentiate the objective functions w.r.t. sR(B) and derive the following Lemma by Leibniz
Theorem.
16R 1
B
hR 
B
qR(t)dt
i
d =
R 1
B
hR 1
t
qR(t)d
i
dt =
R 1
B
qR(t)(1  t)dt = R 1
B
qR()(1  )dt
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Lemma 3 The equilibrium consumer surplus at the boundary is given by sR(B) = sL(B) = 0:
Dene the terms in the bracket of (18) as X. Using Leibniz Theorem, we have
dRN
dsR(B)
=
Z 1
B
@X
@sR(B)
d  Xj=B  dB
dsR(B)
:
As a result, by di¤erentiating (18) with respect to sR(B); we haveZ 1
B
 1  d| {z }
1st term
 

(2B   1)qR(B)  (q
R) (B)

  sR(B)

| {z }
2nd term
dB
dsR(B)| {z }
3rd term
= 0: (22)
These terms represents the costs and benets that accrue to rm R if it changes its price by one
unit. Intuitively, when price is lowered by 1 unit, the rst term represents the aggregate loss in
revenue from all existing consumers of rm R. The second and third terms together represent the
gain in revenue from attracting some potential consumers in rm Ls territory. Specically, the
second term represents the prot from the marginal consumer and the third term represents the
gain in market share from infra-marginal consumers that occurs by lowering price by one unit.
From Lemma 1, we know that
dB
dsR(B)
=
dB
dsL(B)
; (given that sR(B) = sL(B))
=
1
 qL (B)
Substituting this back to (22), we have
(B   1) 

(2B   1)qR(B)  (q
R) (B)

  sR(B)

1
 qL (B) = 0:
After rearranging terms the above equation can be written as
sR(B) = qL (B) (B   1) + (2B   1)qR(B)  (q
R) (B)

: (23)
In the symmetric equilibrium, B = 1=2. Moreover, from Lemma 3 we know that qL (B) = qR (B) =
0: Substituting these in equation (23) we have
sR(B) = 0:
The complete solutions are summarized in the statement of the proposition. Quality schedules
are derived in Lemma 2. By denitions, sL() = 0 +
R 1=2
 q
L(t)dt and sR() = 0 +
R 
1=2 q
R(t)dt:
Hence, the optimal surplus functions are given by
sL() =
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1):
sR() =
  1
2
(2   1)=( 1):
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The optimal price schedules are derived by substituting pL() = (1  )qL()  sL() and pR() =
qR()  sR(): Hence, the optimal prices are given by
pL() = (1  )(1  2)1=( 1)     1
2
(1  2)=( 1); (24)
= (1  2)1=( 1)
 2 + + 1
2

:
pR() = (2   1)1=( 1)     1
2
(2   1)=( 1); (25)
= (2   1)1=( 1)(2 +   1
2
):
9.1.1 Total Welfare, Surplus and Prots
Since rms are symmetric, it is su¢ cient to present the results for any one rm. Without loss of
generality, consider rm L. Then the total surplus is given by
sLN = s
R
N =
Z 1=2
0
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1)d = (  1)
2
4(2  1) :
The total welfare function is given by
wLN =
Z 1=2
0
[uL(q(); )  c(q())]d;
=
Z 1=2
0
[(1  )(1  2)1=( 1)   1

(1  2)=( 1)]d;
=
(2 1 1 + 3)
4( 1 1 + 1)(
1
 1 + 2)
    1
2(2  1) ;
=
3 (  1)2
4(2  1) :
Finally, prots are given by
LN = w
L
N   sLN =
(  1)2
2(2  1) :
9.2 Only One Firm has PPQ
Proof of Proposition 2
In this case, recall that we solve a sequential pricing game since the simultaneous pricing game
does not have a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Without loss of generality, let R be the rm
with PPQ. In stage 2, given rm Ls quality and pricing schedules, rm R will set its quality
schedule equal to the socially optimal quality schedule. Basically, rm R will set the price so that
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the consumers feel indi¤erent between buying from L or R.17 Formally, the problem of rm R in
this case is
max
qR();sR()
RR(); where 
R
R() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

;8 2 [0; 1]: (26)
The equilibrium quality schedule, qR(); can be determined by the rst order condition given by
@RR()
@qR()
=    (qR) 1 () = 0:
=) qR() = 1=( 1)
Ls optimization problem is the same as that in the No-PPQ case except that the individual
rationality constraint (IR2) is now di¤erent (please see below). Since this does not a¤ect the optimal
quality schedule for rm L, it is the same as that in the No-PPQ case and is equal to the following:
qL() = (1  2)1=( 1):
Next we determine the surplus function of rm L. Note that the surplus o¤ered by rm L will depend
on rm Rs socially optimal surplus curve. If rm L were to o¤er less than the socially optimal
surplus of rm R, then rm R could potentially poach Ls consumers by o¤ering lower prices.
The potential for poaching exists since R can perfectly identify each consumer. Ls optimization
problem is the same as that in the No-PPQ case except that the individual rationality constraint
(IR2), instead of being given by sL(B) = sR(B), is replaced by the socially optimal surplus curve
of rm R. Specically, it is given by
sL(B) = max
qR()

qR()  (q
R) ()


j=B:
Similar to the Proof of Lemma 3, di¤erentiating (20) with respect to sL(B); we have
@LR()
@sL(B)
=  B +

(1  2B)qL(B)  sL(B)  (q
L) (B)


dB
dsL(B)
= 0: (27)
Given that
sL(B) = max
qR(B)
BqR(B)  (q
R) (B)

= (1  1

)B=( 1);
we have
dB
dsL(B)
= B 1=( 1): (28)
Substituting this back in (27), it follows that
sL(B) =  B B1=( 1) +

(1  2B)qL(B)  (q
L) (B)


;
= (1  1

)(1  2B)=( 1)  B=( 1):
17There could exist multiple SPNE in this game because rm L can o¤er several p(q ())(outside opportunity) to
rm Rs customers as long as the incentive compatible constraints are satised. Here, we assume that L does not
o¤er any additional discounts to Rs consumers. In other words, the outside opportunity of Rs customers is equal
to (1  )qL(B)  pL(B):
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Given that the marginal consumer feels indi¤erent between buying from rm L and rm R, we have
sL(B) = wR(B)
, (1  1

)(1  2B)=( 1)  B=( 1) = (1  1

)B=( 1);
, B =

(
2  1
  1 )
( 1)= + 2
 1
:
As a consequence, the consumer surplus function of rm L is given by
sL() = sL(B) +
Z B

(1  2t)1=( 1)dt;
= sL(B) + (
  1
2
)(1  2B)=( 1)   (  1
2
)(1  2)=( 1):
Next we derive the consumer surplus function for rm R. Firm R sets the price, equivalently sR(),
such that each consumers surplus exactly matches his/her surplus from the outside opportunity.
Recall that the outside opportunity of Rs consumers is either 0 or equal to the surplus o¤ered by
rm L which is determined by the contract o¤ered to the marginal consumer (qL(B); sL(B)). As a
result, the consumer surplus function of rm R is given by
sR() = max (0; (1  )qL(B)  pL(B)):
Note that we already have derived the expressions for (qL(); sL()) and (qR(); sR()). Hence, by
substituting the relevant expressions in p() = u(q(); )  s();we have
pL() = (1  )(1  2)1=( 1)   sL();  2 [0; B];
pR() = =( 1)   sR();  2 [B; 1]:
9.2.1 Total Welfare, Surplus and Prots
Due to the fact that B, sL(B); and sL() dont have simple closed form solutions, we cannot present
the prices and prots in closed-form solutions. However, we can derive the relevant expressions for
a given value of : For example, when  = 2; we nd that
B = 2 
p
3 = 0:27
Since rm L moves rst, we derive the relevant expressions for surplus, price, and welfare functions
respectively as follows:
sL(B) =
7
2
  2
p
3:
sL() =
1
2

 2 + 22 + 2
p
3  3

:
pL() =  2 + 2  
p
3 +
5
2
:
The total surplus, welfare and prot functions for rm L are given as follows:
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sLR =
Z B
0
sL()d =
1
2
p
3  5
6
:
wLR =
Z B
0
wL()d =
3
2
p
3  5
2
:
LR =
Z B
0
L()d = 5  (3) 32 :
Given all these solutions in the rst stage, we can derive the optimal consumer surplus schedule of
rm R. Firm R o¤ers zero surplus to some of its consumers and then o¤ers positive surplus to those
consumers who are located closer to rm L. Hence, we need to derive the location of the marginal
consumer of rm R who obtains a positive surplus. This is given by the equating the surplus from
outside opportunity (in this case the surplus o¤ered by rm L) to zero.
0 = (1  M )qL(B)  pL(B)
= (1  M )(1  2B)  pL(B)
= (1  M )
h
1  2(2 
p
3)
i
 

 2(2 
p
3) + (2 
p
3)2  
p
3 +
5
2

;
) M =

1
2
p
3  3
p
3 

2 
p
3
2   3
2

= 0:345:
Consequently, the total consumer surplus, welfare and prot of rm R are
sRR =
Z 0:34530
(2 p3)

(1  )  (1  2B)  ( 2B +B2  
p
3 +
5
2
)

d = 0:01 38:
wRR =
Z 1
B
wR()d =
5
6
p
3  1

2 
p
3

:
RR =
1
72

738
p
3  1263

:
9.3 Both Firms have PPQ
Proof of Proposition 3
In this case, both rms know exactly each consumers type. These two rms engage in a
competition similar to Bertrand competition. In equilibrium, both rms o¤er a socially optimal
level of quality.
The rm located closer to a consumer will set the price such that the consumer surplus exactly
matches the highest possible consumer surplus o¤ered by the other rm. The rival rm sets price
at marginal cost. Neither rm will deviate by o¤ering a lower price to its rivalscustomers since
no such action can bring in additional prot. Hence, the prot functions of the rms are given as
follows:
max
qL(); sL()
LBoth(); where 
L
Both() = (1  )qL()  sL() 
(qL) ()

; (29)
max
qR(); sR()
RBoth(); where 
R
Both() = q
R()  sR()  (q
R) ()

: (30)
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Note that as before, rms still optimize with respect to both quality and surplus. Moreover, due
to the perfect targeting of consumers there are no self-selection problems, and thus there is no
potential for cannibalization. Hence, rms do not have to consider any IC constraints from the
consumerspoint of view. Therefore, the optimal quality schedules are determined by
@LBoth()
@qL()
= (1  )   qL 1 () = 0;
, qL() = (1  )1=( 1):
@RBoth()
@qR()
=     qR 1 () = 0;
, qR() = 1=( 1):
Both of these are the socially optimal quality schedules (rst-best solutions).
Given the nature of the price competition between the two rms, we can determine sL(); sR()
and hence demonstrate the optimal price schedules. When  2 [1=2; 1]; consumers buy from rm R
in equilibrium. At the same time, the equilibrium price from rm L is equal to its marginal cost,
(qL)()
 , because of Bertrand price competition. The equilibrium price from rm R is set at a level
so that consumers feel indi¤erent between buying from rm R and rm L.
sR() = (1  )qL()  pL();
= (1  )(1  )1=( 1)   (q
L) ()

= (1  1

)(1  )=( 1):
Similarly, we can derive the consumer surplus function of rm L.This is given by
sL() = qR()  pR();
= (1  1

)=( 1):
The social welfare functions are given by
wL() = uL(q(); )  c(q())
= (1  )qL()  (q
L) ()

= (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2]:
wR() = uR(q(); )  c(q())
= qR()  (q
R) ()

= (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]:
Since p() = u(q(); )  s(); the price charged by each rm is given by
pL() = (1  )=( 1)   (1  1

)=( 1);  2 [0; 1=2]; (31)
pR() = =( 1)   (1  1

)(1  )=( 1);  2 [1=2; 1]: (32)
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9.3.1 Total welfare, surplus and prots
Next, we present the closed-form solutions for the total welfare, surplus and prots. Since rms
are symmetric, it is su¢ cient to present the results from rm L. The total welfare in this case is
given by
wLBoth =
Z 1=2
0
[(1  1

)(1  )=( 1)]d
=
(  1)2
(2  1)(1  2
 (2 1)=( 1)).
The total consumer surplus is given by
sLBoth =
Z 1=2
0

(1  1

)=( 1)

d
=
(  1)2
(2  1)  2
 (2 1)=( 1).
The total prot is given by
LBoth = w
L
Both   sLBoth
=
(  1)2
(2  1)(1  2
 =( 1)):
Proof of Corollary 1
First, by comparing the prices of rm L in the No-PPQ and Both-PPQ cases from equations
(24) and (31), we can show the di¤erence when  = 2 is given by the following equation:
(1  2)
 2 + 3
4

 

(1  )2   1
2
2

=
1
4
 
22   1 < 0: 8 2 [0; 1
2
]
Similarly, we can show that the price of rm R in the Both-PPQ case is higher than that in the
No-PPQ case.
For the case when  = 2; and rm R has PPQ, the price function of rm L is given by
pLR() = 
2   2  
p
3 +
5
2
;  2 [0; 2 
p
3]: (33)
The price of rm L in the No-PPQ case is given by
(1  2)
 2 + 3
4

(34)
Comparing these two equations, we have
2   2  
p
3 +
5
2

  (1  2)
 2 + 3
4

=
7
4
 
p
3 = 0:0179:
The last part of this corollary states that in the case when only rm R has PPQ, some consumers
in Ls market segment may receive lower prices from R. We can verify this by looking at the price
of the marginal consumer located very close to  = 2 p3: This is given by
pRR() = 
2  max (0; 3 + 5
p
3  2
p
3  17
2
);
=) pRR(2 
p
3) = 0:0359 < pLN (2 
p
3) = 0:286:
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Proof of Proposition 4
We rst show that the surplus is lowest at  = 1=2 in the No-PPQ case.
dsL()
d
=
d
d

  1
2
(1  2)=( 1)

=  (1  2)1=( 1) < 0;8 2 [0; 1
2
):
dsR()
d
=
d
d

  1
2
(2   1)=( 1)

= (2   1)1=( 1) > 0;8 2 (1
2
; 1]:
Next, we show that the surplus is highest at  = 1=2 in the Both-PPQ case.
dsL()
d
=
d
d

(1  1

)=( 1)

= 1=( 1) > 0;8 2 [0; 1
2
): (35)
dsR()
d
=
d
d

(1  1

)(1  )=( 1)

=  (1  )1=( 1) < 0;8 2 (1
2
; 1]: (36)
Lastly, we derive the regions in which the consumer surplus from buying from rm L is higher in
the No-PPQ case than that in the Both-PPQ case.
  1
2
(1  2)=( 1)  (1  1

)=( 1)
,   1
2 + 2( 1)=
;8  2 [0; 1
2
):
As a result, the value of b in the main text is 1
2+2( 1)= : Similarly, by symmetry, we can show that
when   b; the consumer surplus from buying from rm R is higher in the No-PPQ case than that
in the Both-PPQ case.
Proof of Corollary 2
We dene welfare of a consumer as the sum of the rms prot from that consumer and the
surplus accruing to that consumer. First note that when only one rm has PPQ, there are three
regions in the market which we need to consider in order to derive the stated result. In the rst
region where  2 [0; B]; the welfare generated from rm L is the same as that in the NoPPQ case.
This is because the quality schedule of the rm L (the NoPPQ rm) remains the same in each
case. The second region under consideration extends from  2 [B; 12 ]. We analyze the welfare in
this region at the end. In the third region where  2 [12 ; 1]; the welfare generated by rm R is higher
in this case compared to the NoPPQ case. This is because these consumers are located closer to
R and get the socially optimal quality from rm R. Given these results, it is su¢ cient for us to
compare the welfare in the second region. When  = 2; the corresponding expressions for rm L
and for rm R, respectively are given by:
wLN () = (1  )(1  2) 
1
2
(1  2)2;  2 [B; 1
2
];
wRR() =     
1
2
2;  2 [B; 1
2
]:
Recall that B = 2   p3: If we compare the welfare of the marginal consumer in the case when
only R has PPQ, we can nd that the welfare of this consumer is lower than what (s)he gets in the
No-PPQ case as given by the following equation:
wLN ()  wRR()
 j=B =  1
2
 
2 + 2   1 j=2 p3 = 0:196:
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The proof of the Part (ii) of the result that each consumer in the Both-PPQ case has the highest
welfare is immediate because the quality is the rst-best solution and each consumer buys from the
rm situated closer to him. This proves the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 5
It is su¢ cient to compare the prots in the case in which both rms adopt PPQ with that when
neither rm adopts PPQ. The prot in the No-PPQ case is given by
LN =
Z B
0

(1  2)qL()  (q
L) ()

  sL(B)

d
=
Z 1=2
0
[(1  2)1=( 1)

2 +   1
2

]d (37)
=
(  1)2
2(2  1) : (38)
The prot in the Both-PPQ case is given by
LBoth =
Z 1=2
0

(1  )qL()  sL()  (q
L) ()


d
=
Z 1=2
0
[(1  1

)((1  )=( 1)   =( 1))]d (39)
= (2  2 1  1 ) (  1)
2
2(2  1) : (40)
Since the rst term in (40) is greater than one for all  > 1; we nd that (40) is always greater
than (38). Thus, the prot of the Both-PPQ case is always higher.
Proof of Proposition 6
In the following paragraphs, we solve for the optimal quality schedules and the location of the
marginal consumer in each case. For the quality schedule of the PPQ rm, all of the results in the
Both-PPQ case still apply because the two rms compete for each individual consumer (each ):
Hence, the results do not depend on the distribution and range of :
 Determining B1(No-PPQ Case)
First, note that the proof of ds
R()
d = q
R () and ds
L()
d =  qL() in Lemma 1 still applies
because the proof does not depend on the value of the upper bound, r. Consider rst the objective
function of rm R. This is given by
max
qR(); sR(B1)
RN where 
R
N =
Z r
B1

qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B1) 
Z 
B1
qR(t)dt

d:
The last term in the integrand can be simplied as follows:Z r
B1
Z 
B1
qR(t)dt

d =
Z r
B1
Z r
t
qR(t)d

dt =
Z r
B1
qR(t)(r   t)dt =
Z r
B1
qR()(r   )dt:
Note that the only di¤erence between this case and our benchmark symmetric No-PPQ case is that
the upper bound of integral here is r rather than 1. Substituting this term back in the objective
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function, we have
RN =
Z r
B1

qR()  (q
R) ()

  sR(B1)  qR()(r   )

d;
=
Z r
B1

(2   r)qR()  sR(B1)  (q
R) ()


d:
The objective function of rm L is the same as that in the benchmark case and can be rewritten as
max
qL(); sL(B1)
LN where 
L
N =
Z B1
0

(1  2)qL()  sL(B1)  (q
L) ()


d:
The optimal quality schedule can be determined by maximizing the integrand pointwise (the terms
in the bracket). The results are listed in Proposition 6.
Di¤erentiating the objective function of rm R with respect to sR(B1); we haveZ r
B1
 1  d  

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  sR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


dB1
dsR(B1)
= 0: (41)
As before, dB1
dsR(B1)
can be derived by equating the consumer surplus from two rms o¤ered at the
boundary to the marginal consumer.
dB1
dsR(B1)
=
1
 qL () :
Substituting this back into (41), we have
(B1   r) 

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)

  sR(B1)

1
 qL (B1) = 0: (42)
This implies that
sR(B1) = q
L (B1) (B1   r) +

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


: (43)
Similarly, we can derive a necessary condition of rm L which is given by
 B1 +

(1  2B1)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)

  sL(B1)

1
qR (B1)
= 0: (44)
This implies that
sL(B1) =  qR (B1)B1 +

(1  2B1)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)


: (45)
Since sR(B1) = sL(B1); we can equate (43) and (45) to derive the following equation.
qL (B1) (B1 r)+

(2B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


=  B1qR (B1)+

(1  2B1)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)


:
Rearranging the terms and substituting qL (B1) = 1  2B1 and qR(B1) = 2B1   r; we have
(3B1   r)qR(B1)  (q
R) (B1)


=

(1  3B1 + r)qL(B1)  (q
L) (B1)


;
,

(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)



=

(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)



;
, [(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)] = [(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)] : (46)
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B1 is the solution that satises this equation. A closed-form solution of the general case is not
tractable. However, it is can be derived numerically for specic values of .
 Determining B2(Only Firm R PPQ Case)
In this case, the procedure to derive B2 is similar to that for deriving B1 except that rm Rs
quality schedule is now di¤erent. From (45), from rm Ls perspective, sL(B2) is given by
sL(B2) =  qR (B2) (B2) +

(1  2B2)qL(B2)  (q
L) (B2)


: (47)
sR(B2) is determined by the socially optimal surplus function of buying from rm R. Since
sL(B2) = s
R(B2);
() sL(B2) = max
qR(B2)
B2 q
R(B2)  (q
R) (B2)

;
() sL(B2) = (1  1

)B
=( 1)
2 : (48)
Intuitively if sL(B2) < (1   1)B
=( 1)
2 ; because of rm Rs ability to target consumers, the
marginal consumer at B2 will end up buying from rm R. Hence, for all consumers of rm L, sL(B2)
must be greater than (1  1)B
=( 1)
2 . The marginal consumer is determined by equating the two
surplus functions. From equations (47) and (48), we have
 B2  qR (B2) +

(1  2B2)qL(B2)  (q
L) (B2)


= (1  1

)B
=( 1)
2 :
Substituting qL (B2) by (1  2B2)1=( 1) and qR (B2) by B1=( 1)2 ; we have
 B2 B1=( 1)2 +
"
(1  2B2)=( 1)   (1  2B2)
=( 1)

#
= (1  1

)B
=( 1)
2 ;
which on further simplication can be written as
(1  1

)(1  2B2)=( 1) = (2  1

)B
=( 1)
2 ;
, 1  2B2
B2
=

2  1
  1
( 1)=
;
, B2 =
"
2 +

2  1
  1
( 1)=# 1
: (49)
 Determining B3 (Only Firm L PPQ Case)
Similar to the procedure of determining B2, rm Rs consumer surplus at B3 is derived by (43)
and given as
sR(B3) = q
L (B3) (B3   r) +

(2B3   r)qR(B3)  (q
R) (B3)


:
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Since rm L has PPQ, the optimal quality schedule is given by
qL (B3) = (1 B3)1=( 1):
Hence, the socially optimal consumer surplus curve of rm L at B3 is given by
sL (B3) = (1  1

)(1 B3)=( 1):
Since sR(B3) = sL (B3) ; we have
(B3   r)qL (B3) +

(2B3   r)qR(B3)  (q
R) (B3)


= (1  1

)(1 B3)=( 1):
After substituting qL (B3) by (1 B3)1=( 1) and qR (B3) by (2B3  r)1=( 1); this equation can be
written as
(B3   r)(1 B3)1=( 1) + (1  1

)(2B3   r)=( 1) = (1  1

)(1 B3)=( 1): (50)
B3 is the solution that satises this equation but the closed-form solution of B3 is intractable.
However, for any given value of  and r; B3 can be solved for numerically.
 Determining B4 (Both PPQ Case)
Both rms compete at the individual consumers level. In mathematical terms, they maximize
their objective function as if  is given. Hence, the solutions do not depend on the distribution of
 at all. As a result, it is immediate that B4 = 1=2 just as we have in the baseline case.
9.4 Specic example ( = 2)
For illustrative purposes we solve the cases when the cost function is quadratic.
Case 1: B1:
When  = 2; equation (46) can be further simplied as
2(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)2

=

2(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)2

;
,  2(3B1   r)(2B1   r)  (2B1   r)2   2(1  3B1 + r)(1  2B1)  (1  2B1)2 = 0;
,  2r   6B1 + 2rB1   r2 + 1 = 0;
, B1 = 2r   r
2 + 1
6  2r : (51)
Case 2: B2:
Equation (49) can be further simplied as
B2 = 1=
h
2 + (3)1=2
i
= 2 
p
3:
Case 3: B3:
When  = 2; equation (50) is equivalent to
(B3   r)(1 B3) + 1
2
(2B3   r)2 = 1
2
(1 B3)2:
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The solution of this equation is given by B3 = r +
p
5  2r   2:
When r = 1, B3 =
p
3  1: Comparing this to the solution of B2; by the symmetry of the game
we must have
B3 = 1 B2;
,
p
3  1 = 1 

2 
p
3

;
which veries our derivations.
Proof of Propositions 7 and 8
The proofs of Propositions 7 and 8 follow directly from the results of Proposition 6, by comparing
the di¤erent quality schedules. We only need to show that
(1  )1=( 1)  (1  2)1=( 1)
, (1  )  (1  2),   0:
Further, we need to show that
1=( 1)  (2   r)1=( 1)
,   (2   r), r  :
The last equality is true because  is uniformly distributed between [0; r]:
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